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Abstract Prejudicial beliefs are often associated with ignorance. Indeed, com-
mon views of prejudice hold that it is precisely in their ignorance that those with
prejudicial beliefs perpetrate a wrong to the victim of the prejudicial belief. This
view of prejudice neatly accounts for the prejudices of epistemically culpable epi-
stemic agents. But what about cases where a prejudice is held by an epistemically
exculpable epistemic agent? This paper presents an example of a deeply preju-
diced belief about Indigenous Peoples, taken from a recent ethnography of rural
Wisconsin, and argues that it is epistemically exculpable. If it is indeed epistem-
ically exculpable, then we need to look beyond the individual when directing our
blame for the prejudicial belief; we can only be disappointed in the circumstances
that enable an epistemic agent to be epistemically exculpable for expressing such
a belief.
1 Introduction
This paper aĴempts to give an epistemological account of the phenomenon identified
as “the politics of resentment” by the sociologist Katherine Cramer, which “arises from
the way social identities, the emotion of resentment, and economic insecurity inter-
act”.1 Specifically, the paper argues that we cannot epistemically blame certain indi-
vidualswithin the politics of resentment for their extremely prejudiced,morally blame-
worthy beliefs. In section 2, I present the central case under discussion in the paper as
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1. Katherine J. Cramer, The Politics of Resentment: Rural Consciousness in Wisconsin and the Rise
of ScoĴ Walker (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016), 9.
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it appears in Cramer’s ethnography of political consciousness in rural Wisconsin: a
rural Wisconsinite’s deeply prejudiced belief about Indigenous Peoples.2 3 In section
3, I motivate Endre Begby’s challenge to a common view of prejudice, which shows
that prejudiced belief can be epistemically justified, and his notion of highly non-ideal
epistemic contexts as sufficient circumstances for epistemic exculpation of prejudiced be-
liefs. In section 4, I show howwe can extendMiranda Fricker’s condition for epistemic
exculpation of testimonial injustice, historical-cultural distance from the present moral
discourse, to the central case in this paper. Ultimately, this paper suggests a counterin-
tuitive, perhaps troubling conclusion about prejudicial beliefs produced in the “politics
of resentment”; that, in Fricker’s terms, we cannot extend a “resentment of blame” to
those with prejudicial beliefs, but only a “resentment of disappointment”.4
2 The Politics of Resentment: The Central Case
In the period betweenMay 2007 andNovember 2012, the sociologist Katherine Cramer
visited 27 different community groups, mostly in rural communities, across Wiscon-
sin, to listen to their conversations.5 In doing so, Cramer’s “mainmotivationwas not to
get at howwell people make sense of politics, but to get at how they do so”.6 Cramer’s
findings encompassed a broad spectrum of issues, from views on economics, to health-
care, to the University of Wisconsin-Madison.7 Here, I focus on the findings with dis-
tinctively high moral stakes: the prejudicial beliefs that racially dominant groups have
on racially dominated groups. For the purposes of the paper, I take it for granted that
2. I want to flag in advance that I will be quoting directly this lengthy, dehumanising prejudicial
belief, and to emphasise that discussion of the belief will occur throughout the paper. The quote begins
on the next page. My thanks to Dr. Aidan McGlynn for guidance on flagging this aspect of the paper,
and for prompting my inclusion of the following footnote.
3. It is important to acknowledge at the outset of this paper that the appropriate collective term of
reference for so-called “Indigenous Peoples” is controversial and contested. The prejudiced belief un-
der discussion, since it does not specify a specific tribal identity, all but forces my hand to use this
collective term which, although less harmful than some other terms, is nonetheless directly connected
to the centuries-long, ongoing practices of seĴler-colonialism perpetrated against Indigenous Peoples.
For an excellent introduction to the importance of this issue, see Michael Yellow Bird, “What We Want
to Be Called: Indigenous Peoples’ Perspectives on Racial and Ethnic Identity Labels,” American Indian
Quarterly 23, no. 2 (1999): p. 1, hĴps://doi.org/10.2307/1185964. For work on the role of misrepres-
entation in the marginalization of Indigenous Peoples in contemporary higher education, see Adrienne
Keene, e.g. “Representations MaĴer: Serving Native Students in Higher Education,” Jcscore 1, no. 1
(June 2018): pp. 101-111, hĴps://doi.org/10.15763/issn.2642-2387.2015.1.1.101-111. I am very grateful to
members of the “Decolonise UWC” Facebook group for guidance and literature recommendations on
this issue.
4. Miranda Fricker, Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing (Oxford; New York: Ox-
ford University Press, 2007), 104.
5. Cramer, The Politics of Resentment, 29, 35.
6. Ibid., 20.
7. Ibid., 37, 46, 210.
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white Americans constitute the racially dominant group, and non-white Americans
constitute racially dominated groups. Thus, I take as the central case for the paper the
views of “Ron”, a white “man in the group of loggers in northwest Wisconsin”, speak-
ing about “American Indians” who live on the local reservation.8 9 Here is Ron’s view
of the Indigenous Peoples living in the local reservation:
And, there, there’s too many programs down there for a bunch of people,
you know to have it for them to want to go to work. You know? They got
the casino down there shoving ourmoney through ‘em, they got the federal
government shoving ourmoney through ‘em, and theywonderwhere they
got drunken alcohol problems, they got nothing to do all day besides siĴing
around and do what they want to do. And they keep giving ‘em money to
do it, well how do you expect to get anything out of anybody? There’s an
old saying: A hungry dog hunts harder. Hey, you keep feeding a dog or a
cat, they’re not gonna hunt, they’re not gonna look for food, they’re gonna
lay around and get fat. 10
Herein, this case will be referred to as ‘RON’. Now, perhaps somewhat counter-
intuitively, when Cramer listened to Ron express this racist view—complete with a
likening of Indigenous Peoples living in reservations to lazy, fat domestic animals—
she didn’t take it to be an expression of “just plain racism”. Rather, for Cramer, taken
in context, Ron’s racism is baked into “a much more complex process of sense mak-
ing” that constitutes how he “make[s] sense of public affairs”.11 Or put more bluntly,
as Cramer sees it, Ron isn’t being racist for the sake of it, or simply because he’s a bigot,
but because his understanding of society requires it. Cramer understands this kind of
racism as a consequence of the sense of identity unique to rural Wisconsinites, which
she calls “rural consciousness”, and the “broader structural forces” they are subject to,
which together amount to a “politics of resentment”.12 Therefore, to sufficiently un-
derstand cases like RON requires a consideration of the role that Ron’s location in a
politics of resentment plays. Cramer’s diagnosis of this kind of prejudice, I will now
argue, finds support in the recent work of Endre Begby on epistemic responsibility.
8. Ibid., 88.
9. As mentioned in footnote 3., the nature of Ron’s prejudiced belief makes it difficult to specify with
certainty what specific reservation he is referring to. There are twelve federally recognised First Na-
tions within the state of Wisconsin, and most of northern Wisconsin lies on Ojibwe land—however
there are several reservations within just north-west Wisconsin so it is impossible to know with cer-
tainty which “local” reservation Ron has in mind. For a map of the reservations in Wisconsin, see
“Current Tribal Lands Map and Native Nations Facts,” Wisconsin First Nations, March 31, 2020,
hĴps://wisconsinfirstnations.org/current-tribal-lands-map-native-nations-facts/.
10. Cramer, The Politics of Resentment, 88.
11. Ibid., 18, 89.
12. Ibid., 24.
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3 Begby’s Account of Epistemic Culpability
Begby’s account of epistemic responsibility supports Cramer’s diagnosis of RON by:
(a) problematising a “common view” of prejudice and (b) developing the notion of
highly non-ideal epistemic contexts.
3.1 Problematising a “common view” on prejudice
Begby defines a prejudice as “a negatively charged, materially false stereotype target-
ing some social group and, derivatively, the individuals that comprise this group”.13
Working under this definition, Begby challenges a “common view” of prejudice ad-
vocated for by both NomyArpaly andMiranda Fricker.14 Roughly, this common view
holds that prejudices “always arise from some specifiable mishandling of evidence”
such that they are deemed epistemically culpable and irrational.15 Begby challenges
this view on the basis that it “takes for granted a characterization of prejudices in terms
of universal generalizations” and that this assumption is incorrect “at least for the ma-
jority of common and pernicious prejudices”.16 This assumption, Begby argues, elides
the distinction between “generic judgements” and “universal generalizations” when
identifying stereotype judgements. i.e. it assumes stereotypes make universal gener-
alizations about groups, rather than fallible generalizations.17 Thus “all immigrants
are illegal aliens” is a universal generalization, but “immigrants are illegal aliens” is a
generic judgement. This, albeit subtle, distinction is crucial because, as Begby points
out, universal generalizations are far more sensitive to negative instances than generic
judgements.18 A single negative instance is enough to comprehensively undermine a
universal generalization: if I come across a “legal” immigrant, then that is sufficient
evidence to undermine, via falsification, the universal generalization “all immigrants
are illegal aliens”, since that proposition is incompatible with the proposition “this im-
migrant is legal.” However, the generic judgement “immigrants are illegal aliens” is
not falsifiable in the same way, even in the face of the same evidence. The proposition
“immigrants are illegal aliens” is compatible with “this immigrant is legal”, since we
can understand the generic judgement to express a tendency, rather than a necessary
condition, of a group. Thus the generic judgement that immigrants tend to be illegal
aliens can accommodate a couple of “legal” immigrants here and there in a way that a
universal generalization cannot. The upshot of this distinction is that while it is obvi-
ously an “epistemic mistake” to sustain a falsified universal generalization, it is much
13. Endre Begby, “The Epistemology of Prejudice,” Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2, no. 2 (2013):
pp. 90-99, hĴps://doi.org/10.1002/tht3.71, 90.
14. Begby, “The Epistemology of Prejudice”, 90.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid., 91.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid., 94.
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less clear that to sustain a generic judgement in the face of a counterexample consti-
tutes such a mistake.19 In this way, prejudices, “once they are internalized. . . can quite
reasonably come to control the assessment and interpretation of new evidence”.20 This
aspect of “epistemic insidiousness” is not captured by the common view endorsed by
Fricker and Arpaly.21
For illustration, Begby refers to Arpaly’s hypothetical case of Solomon, “a boy who
lives in a small, isolated farming community in a poor country” who believes that wo-
men are significantly less intellectually able than men.22 The “common view” holds
that while in this context, Solomon is not epistemically culpable for this belief, and so
cannot be said to be prejudiced, for lack of evidence to suggest otherwise.23 However,
the common view holds that once Solomon encounters countervailing evidence to this
belief (for example, at university where there are countless women who are at least as
intellectually capable as men) then he becomes epistemically culpable for his belief.24
If Solomon’s belief relies on a universal generalization that “all women are intellectu-
ally inferior to men”, then it seems the prediction of the common view holds, since he
has encountered countless exceptions to this generalization at university. However,
if his belief relies on a generic judgement about women’s intellectual abilities com-
pared to men’s, then it can be rationally revised to something like: “only women who
study at university can be the intellectual equals or superiors of men.” Indeed, this
actually seems like the more rational response to his evidence. For Solomon would be
revising his belief about women proportionate to the countervailing evidence: he has
encountered evidence to suggest that “women at university are intellectually capable”,
but has not encountered evidence to suggest that “women not at university are intel-
lectually capable.” To form the laĴer belief, then, would be to form a belief without
evidence. The upshot here is that Solomon seems epistemically justified, rather than
culpable, for maintaining the generic judgement that women tend to be less intellectu-
ally capable than men. But this, clearly, is still a false stereotype that wrongs women.
Thus, Begby concludes that we need to “move beyond” the common view “to determ-
ine the exact nature of Solomon’s prejudice”.25 More precisely, if we are to understand
“how prejudices are capable of absorbing or subsuming such contrary evidence, we
must recognize that they paint a more complex picture of the world than the common
view assumes”.26
Begby’s treatment of Solomon is remarkably consonant with Cramer’s judgement
of RON.As Cramer notes, whenwe fully contextualize RONwe see that Ron ismaking
19. Ibid., 92.
20. Ibid., 91.
21. Ibid., 97.
22. Ibid., 91.
23. Ibid.
24. Nomy Arpaly, Unprincipled Virtue: an Inquiry into Moral Agency (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2011), 104.
25. Begby, “The Epistemology of Prejudice”, 92.
26. Ibid., 97.
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a comparison between an “American Indian” he works with, and those that live on
reservations:
RON: Yeah. You know. Well like him that just left, that was here before to get
coffee?
KJC: Yeah.
RON: He’s an American Indian. [One sentence deleted for confidentiality.]
KJC: Oh really?
RON: He’s a good guy.
KJC: Yeah.
RON: Works hard. Yeah.
KJC: Well sure.
RON: But he won’t live on the reservation where they get all that free housing
and stuff, he’s self-supporting, you know?
KJC: Yeah.
RON: And, there, there’s too many programs down there for a bunch of people,
you know to have it for them to want to go to work. . . they’re gonna lay around
and get fat.” 27
When we put Ron’s prejudiced tirade in context, it appears to be a paradigmatic
example of a stereotype premised on a generic judgement, and not a general univer-
salization. RONdoes not express that “all Indigenous Peoples are lazy alcoholics”, but,
rather, that “Indigenous Peoples who live on reservations are lazy alcoholics”. As we
can see, this stereotype permits him to rationally hold that some Indigenous Peoples
can be “good guy[s]” with a good work ethic, while others have a work ethic that,
Ron believes, permit dehumanising comparisons with domestic animals. It doesn’t
seem unreasonable to suppose that perhaps, at some point, Ron didn’t believe Indi-
genous Peoples to be capable of having a good work ethic at all, but, upon working
with one of them, revised his belief accordingly in the face of that evidence. i.e. just as
Solomon, while at university encountered evidence that the women there were intelli-
gent, Ron, while at work encountered evidence that the Indigenous Person there had a
good work ethic. Thus, just as with Solomon, to expect Ron to revise his belief further
than his evidence permits is to expect him to act irrationally. As counterintuitive and
troubling as it may seem, on this analysis Ron is not epistemically culpable. Hence,
Begby’s treatment of the Solomon example gives Cramer’s claim that “To call [RON]
27. Cramer, The Politics of Resentment, 88.
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just plain racism misses the complexity of the sentiments involved here” an epistemic
basis.28 To call Ron’s prejudice “just plain racism” does not recognise the epistemic in-
sidiousness of his belief, and thus provides an oversimplified diagnosis of the wrong
that his prejudice perpetrates.
3.2 Epistemic agents in “highly non-ideal epistemic contexts”
Elsewhere, Begby develops the notion of “highly non-ideal [epistemic] contexts”
(HNIEC).29 Paradigmatic examples of HNIEC are those where people “grow up in
deeply prejudicial social seĴings, with no rational access to contrary evidence”.30
In such cases, epistemic agents’ prejudiced beliefs are simply “the predictable con-
sequences of their limited epistemic opportunities”.31 In this way, they are “victims”
with the “peculiarly bad luck of growing up in a severely constrained socio-epistemic
environment”.32 Thus on Begby’s account of doxastic responsibility, being raised in a
HNIEC is a sufficient condition for epistemic exculpation of a prejudiced belief.
Now, recall that Cramer’s entire project is premised on the motivation not to evalu-
ate, but simply to understand, how ruralWisconsites “make sense of politics”.33 While
not made explicit, this approach seems to presuppose, on Cramer’s part, an under-
standing that these people are not operating in ideal epistemic contexts. Specifically,
Cramer seems to identify two distinct ways in which rural Wisconsinites like Ron are
subject to HNIECs. Indeed, I will now show that not only is one’s rural consciousness
“materially” reinforced through the everyday lived experiences of those with a similar
share of political power, like one’s family or colleagues, but it can also be “symbolic-
ally” exploited by those with a higher share of political power, like politicians.
3.2.1 Reinforcement of prejudice
Essential to rural consciousness is the sense that rural Wisconsinites are victims of dis-
tributive injustice, and that “rural folks are fundamentally different from urbanites
in terms of lifestyles, values, and work ethic”.34 In a 2011 state-wide opinion poll,
Cramer found that “69 percent of rural respondents felt rural areas received much less
or somewhat less than their fair share” of government resources.35 Cramer shows that
this claim is unequivocally false: “the evidence certainly does not support the notion
28. Ibid.
29. Endre Begby, “Doxastic Morality,” Philosophical Topics 46, no. 1 (2018): pp. 155-172, ht-
tps://doi.org/10.5840/philtopics20184619, 166.
30. Begby, “Doxastic Morality”, 168.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. Cramer, The Politics of Resentment, 24.
34. 35.Ibid., 5.
35. Ibid., 105.
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that urban counties receive far more than their share of tax dollars per resident” —in
fact “rural counties in the aggregate pay somewhat less in taxes per person and receive
approximately similar amounts of money in return”.36
However, rather than concluding from this that rural consciousness is fundament-
ally an irrational, ignorant social identity, Cramer provides evidence that such com-
munities, while not victims of distributive injustice, face considerable pressures. First,
rural counties “tend to experience greater levels of poverty, lower wages, and mod-
estly higher levels of unemployment”.37 Second, rural communities have been “exper-
iencing a long, slow death for decades”, and fighting a “losing baĴle economically”
—local businesses, the lifeblood and pride of rural communities, cannot compete with
franchises and the rapidly expanding global economy.38 Third, “providing broadband
service is a more daunting task in a sparsely populated community than it is in a dense
urban one” due to “economies of scale”, and “[e]ducation levels tend to be lower” in
rural communities.39
Taken individually, these facts will present their own obstacles to epistemic
practices—limited broadband will hinder access to online sources of information, for
instance. When taken together, these facts constitute an extremely constrained socio-
epistemic environment and thus will shape one’s epistemic character. Moreover, if
one is interacting with people subject to the same constraints, the beliefs emerging
from such an environment will be mutually reinforcing. Thus, while it may be true
that rural consciousness, as expressed by those who share it, is premised on fiction,
that is only part of the epistemic story here. If we are misguided when we judge So-
lomon’s epistemic character without having considered the epistemic context he was
raised in, the same applies to our judgement of RON. Ron, as a rural Wisconsinite, is
statisticallymore likely to have experienced greater levels of poverty, lowerwages, less
employment, lower levels of education, and been raised in a dying community, and is
surrounded by people who are not likely to challenge his beliefs. If this doesn’t qualify
as a HNIEC, it’s unclear what would. And if being raised in a HNIEC is sufficient for
epistemic exculpation, then on this basis we ought to epistemically exculpate RON.
3.2.2 Exploitation of Prejudice
Rural consciousness will not only be shaped by severe material constraints and rein-
forced by interactions with individuals who share that social identity, like colleagues
and family members. RON’s socio-epistemic context is also one of “a broader politics
in which tapping into resentment is an effective political strategy”.40 Although rural
36. Ibid., 91.
37. Ibid., 94.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid., 99.
40. Ibid., 21.
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consciousness is “not something that any one politician instilled in people overnight—
or even over a few months”, political actors “mobilize support” by “tapping into” its
latent resentment when it may be politically advantageous.41 According to Cramer,
politicians like ScoĴ Walker “made use of the desire for people to make sense of their
world, to figure out who is to blame and identify boundaries that clearly show that
those who are to blame are not one of us” to win gubernatorial elections.42 In this case,
rather than challenging rural consciousness,Walker encouraged it for his political gain.
Thus, there is a mutually reinforcing vertical relationship between those in power
and those who give power. The former have motivation to rather than challenge, ex-
ploit the prejudices of rural consciousness, while the laĴer have motivation to vote
for those who they feel represented by: those political actors who do not challenge
their social identity and way of life. Cramer characterises this as “a political culture in
which political divides are rooted in our most basic understandings of ourselves, in-
fuse our everyday relationships, and are used for electoral advantage by our political
leaders”.43 In this context of a politics of resentment, those with the power—both sym-
bolic andmaterial—to challenge prejudicial beliefs are motivated to instead encourage
those beliefs.
Thus we can see that the politics of resentment constitutes a HNIEC in two distinct
ways. First, the basic material conditions of Ron’s life will be highly non-epistemically
ideal, and he is not likely to regularly encounter individuals who will challenge his
beliefs. Second, Ron’s prejudicial beliefs are more likely to be encouraged, rather than
challenged, by the political actors he feels represented by. Thus, insofar as RON is a
consequence of the politics of resentment, RON is a consequence of aHNIEC, therefore
epistemically exculpating RON.
4 Epistemic Injustice in a Politics of Resentment?
Having shown RON to be epistemically exculpable on the basis that the expressed pre-
judice can be understood as rational, and that Ron is subject to aHNIEC, I nowproceed
to discuss how cases like RON affect a prominent account of epistemic injustice. Mir-
anda Fricker, in her foundational work on epistemic injustice, appears to only treat
historical cases of exculpatory epistemic contexts, and not contemporaneous cases like
RON. Hence, as it stands RON is not epistemically culpable according to Fricker’s ac-
count. I now present and aĴempt to resolve this prima facie problem, ultimately show-
ing RON to be compatible with Fricker’s account.
41. Ibid., 19, 213, 221.
42. Ibid., 207.
43. Ibid., 211.
68 Aporia Vol. 20
4.1 Resentment of Disappointment in mid-20th Century USA
Consider the following characterisation of one of Fricker’s central cases of “epistemic
injustice” (which we can refer to as ‘USA1950s’):
USA1950s: Herbert is a well-to-do middle aged man raised in the United States of
America in the first half of the 20th century. At some point in the 1950s, his daughter-
in-law, Marge gives testimony to Herbert about the whereabouts of her husband, Her-
bert’s son. To this, Herbert dismissively responds “Marge, there’s female intuition,
and then there are facts”.44
Fricker holds that Herbert’s treatment ofMarge in this case constitutes an epistemic
injustice (EIJ). For Fricker, an EIJ is perpetrated when someone is harmed by someone
else “specifically in their capacity as a knower”.45 The specific kind of EIJ perpetrated
here is a testimonial injustice, which occurs when someone is afforded an identity-
prejudicial credibility deficit (IPCD).46 An IPCD consists in a speaker being given less
credibility than they otherwise would have due to their hearer having an identity pre-
judice against them.47 In this way, the speaker is harmed specifically in their capacity
as a knower because their aĴempt to communicate knowledge is undermined by their
hearer’s prejudice against them. Fricker later characterises the perpetration of a testi-
monial injustice as a failure to exercise the virtue of testimonial justice.48 Such a virtu-
ous hearer “neutralizes the impact of prejudice in her credibility judgements” which
requires a “distinctly reflexive critical social awareness” either “actively” or “spontan-
eously”.49
But while Fricker identifies USA1950s as a paradigmatic case of epistemic injustice,
she exculpates Herbert since he is in a cultural-historical “seĴing in which there is liĴle
critical awareness of the construction of gender”.50 Fricker takes this lack of critical
awareness to result in a lack of “conceptual resources” available to individuals in that
context.51 In the USA in the 1950s, then, where there was such a lack of critical aware-
ness of the construction of gender, on Fricker’s view we can say that the impoverished
conceptual resources available to that society were conducive to perpetrating identity
prejudice against women, rather than cultivating the virtue of testimonial justice with
respect to women. This is borne out when we consider our intuitive response to the
following case:
USA2019: Herbert is a well-to-do middle aged man raised in the United States of
America towards the end of the 20th century. At some point in 2019, his daughter-in-
44. Adapted from Fricker, Epistemic Injustice, 9.
45. Fricker, Epistemic Injustice, 1.
46. Ibid., 28.
47. Ibid., 27-28.
48. Ibid., 86.
49. Ibid., 91-92.
50. Ibid., 99.
51. Ibid., 103.
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law, Marge gives testimony to Herbert about the whereabouts of her husband, Her-
bert’s son. To this, Herbert dismissively responds “Marge, there’s female intuition,
and then there are facts.”
In USA2019, it seems clear that Herbert is culpable for his IPCD against Marge.
In 2019, rather than a lack, there is an abundance of conceptual resources available
to individuals for them to develop critical awareness of the construction of gender.
For instance, feminist scholarship has since become well-established. Given this, we
have grounds for expecting more from the Herbert in USA2019 compared to the Her-
bert in USA1950s, since, for example, in the former there exist established concepts
such as “gender performativity”, whereas in the laĴer there do not. Fricker articulates
this difference in Herbert’s blameworthiness by distinguishing between “routine” and
“exceptional” discursive “moves in a moral discourse”.52 Exercising the virtue of testi-
monial justice in USA1950s would require an “exceptional” discursive move given the
moral discourse of that context, since the “routine” move would have been to per-
petrate IPCD against women. Likewise, exercising the virtue of testimonial justice in
USA2019 would only require a “routine” move given the moral discourse of today.
Fricker holds that in cases where agents are at fault for not making an exceptional
move, they are not culpable for failing to make that move since they were not “in
a position to know beĴer”.53 54 Thus, it is only in cases where agents fail to make
routine moves that they can be held culpable for the failure to make it, since it is only
in these cases that they are in a position to know beĴer. In cases of culpable ignorance,
our intuitive “resentment of blame” towards such prejudiced individuals is justified
i.e. our resentment of their prejudice is grounded in a legitimate levelling of blame
towards them.55 However, in cases of exculpable ignorance, we are only justified in
a “resentment of disappointment”.56 Here, our justification for resentment of preju-
diced individuals only extends as far as our disappointment in their failure to make
the exceptional move, which is no justification for blame towards them.
This distinction seems tomake the right predictions: if I’m a doctor Iwould be culp-
able for not knowing how to treat a common, extant virus, but I can hardly be deemed
culpable for not knowing how to treat a virus that has not yet been discovered. In the
former case I would have failed a routine move for doctors—knowing how to treat
52. Ibid., 104.
53. Ibid., 100.
54. There are, of course, many other accounts dealing with blameworthiness in potentially exculp-
ating contexts besides Fricker’s. For some of these recent accounts, see e.g. Nomy Arpaly and
Timothy Schroeder, “Praise, Blame and the Whole Self,” Philosophical Studies 93, no. 2 (1999): pp.
161-188, hĴps://doi.org/10.1023/a:1004222928272., Lisa BortoloĴi and Kengo Miyazono, “The Ethics
of Delusional Belief,” Erkenntnis 81, no. 2 (2015): pp. 275-296, hĴps://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-015-
9739-9., Sanford C. Goldberg, “Should Have Known,” Synthese 194, no. 8 (2015): pp. 2863-2894,
hĴps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0662-z., and ElinorMason, “Moral Ignorance and Blameworthiness,”
Philosophical Studies 172, no. 11 (2015): pp. 3037-3057, hĴps://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-015-0456-7.
55. Ibid., 104.
56. Ibid.
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common viruses—but in the laĴer case I have failed to make an exceptional move—
discovering a new common virus. Thus, by appealing to the “historical contingency”
of Herbert in USA1950s, Fricker justifies his exculpation.57 However, Fricker’s dis-
cussion of such exculpatory contexts focusses exclusively on cultures constrained by
“historical distance” from the present moral discourse.58
4.2 Resentment of Disappointment in a Politics of Resentment
With reference to the foregoing analysis of RON, I now propose that Fricker’s distinc-
tion between routine/exceptional discursive moves also holds for cultures contempor-
aneous to the present moral discourse, and thus exculpates the prejudice in RON. But
before doing so, I briefly anticipate an objection to this approach.
One might object that Fricker’s endorsement of the “common view” of prejudice
suggests that her account of epistemic exculpation is incompatible with cases like RON
that undermine the common view, i.e., how can I now be endorsing Fricker’s view on
exculpating certain prejudiced subjects, when I earlier rejected her view as to what
constitutes being a prejudiced subject? The response to this objection is simply to bite
the bullet and maintain that Fricker’s initial verdict about Solomon seems mistaken.
Insofar as the common view has been undermined as a plausible definition of culpable
prejudice, what it predicts is inconsequential for further analyses of culpability about
prejudice. Moreover, Fricker’s account of epistemic exculpation is not developed in
terms of the nature of the prejudice, but the context in which the prejudice is perpet-
rated. Therefore, nothing of substance in Fricker’s account of exculpation is contingent
on the specific nature of the prejudice, and sowe can both reject her endorsement of the
common view and endorse her notion of exculpatory contexts. Thus, we only need to
focus on whether Fricker’s distinction between routine/exceptional moves in a moral
discourse can apply to non-temporal distance from the present moral discourse. If it
can, then historical distance is not a necessary condition for the relevant kind of inac-
cessibility to be in play on Fricker’s view, which clears the ground for cases like RON
to be compatible with Fricker’s conditions for exculpability.
Indeed, historical distance does not seem necessary for the relevant kind of in-
accessibility to be in play. What is relevant to the distance from the present moral
discourse in Fricker’s analysis is not its metaphysical inaccessibility—that such con-
cepts literally did not exist in USA1950s—but that they are functionally inaccessible.
In otherwords, it is not themetaphysical status simpliciter—whether it exists or not—of
a concept that is necessary for some agent to be able to access it. It is the metaphysical
status of the concept relative to the agent that is necessary for the agent to be able to
57. Ibid., 100.
58. But for a passing suggestion about the possibility of “cultural distance” see Miranda Fricker,
“The Relativism of Blame and Williams’s Relativism of Distance,” Aristotelian Society Supplementary
Volume 84, no. 1 (January 2010): pp. 151-177, hĴps://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8349.2010.00190.x, 167.
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access it. Although the non-existence of a concept is a sure way to guarantee its inac-
cessibility to some agent—since it will be inaccessible to all agents—it is not necessary.
A conceptmight exist but be inaccessible to an agent all the same, rendering it func-
tionally inaccessible. We can all too easily imagine a situation where a ‘Big Pharma’
company has discovered a new common virus at a time t, but kept it under lock and
key from the rest of the medical community because it is in their financial interest.
But although the virus has been discovered at t, we could hardly hold the doctors not
privy to its existence at t culpable for not knowing how to treat the virus after t. It is
irrelevant to our judgement of the doctors that at t-1 the treatment was metaphysically
inaccessible and at t+1 it was metaphysically accessible. What is relevant is that at t-1 it
was inaccessible and t onwards it remained inaccessible to all but the Big Pharma com-
pany. Hence, to alter our judgement of the ignorant doctors from before t and after t
would be to hold them accountable for the actions of the Big Pharma company—for an
action they were completely unaware of. This seems like a very wrongheaded concep-
tualization of epistemic responsibility. Thus, if mere metaphysical accessibility is not
sufficient for moral responsibility, then historical distance is not necessarily the only
kind of distance required for epistemic exculpation. That is, the doctors in the above
example are distant in a non-historical sense from the knowledge of the virus treat-
ment, a sense we might perhaps call “organisational distance”. This organisational
distance seems sufficient to exculpate them for their ignorance in this case.59
I submit that a similar kind of distance applies to Ron’s ignorance, which leads him
to RON. Ron’s lack of conceptual resources for avoiding prejudice against Indigenous
Peoples on the local reservation is not metaphysical – the conceptual resources to not
stereotype Indigenous Peoples certainly do exist. But Ron is plausibly a victim of a
relevant kind of inaccessibility, caused by his location in a HNIEC. This reading of
Fricker’s distinction ismade further plausiblewhenwe understand Fricker’s regard for
USA1950s as implicitly treating it as a HNIEC. Recall Begby’s definition of a HNIEC:
where people “grow up in deeply prejudicial social seĴings, with no rational access to
contrary evidence”.60 This seems to resemble Fricker’s regard for Herbert’s context in
USA1950s. Furthermore, Fricker herself characterisesHerbert in USA1950s as a subject
of “bad luck”, matching Begby’s characterisation of those subject toHNIECS as victims
59. Full discussion of the metaphysical commitments of my argument is beyond the scope of this pa-
per. For discussion of the relevant notion of “metaphysical trans-substantiation” (whereby “[a]lthough
there is no new stuff in the world. . . new entities [can] come into being” ), see Judith Baker, “The
Metaphysical Construction of Value,” Journal of Philosophy 86, no. 10 (1989): pp. 505-513, ht-
tps://doi.org/10.5840/jphil1989861020, 507. For interesting discussions of the contingency of ethical
judgements on metaphysical commitments, see Roy Sorensen, “Future Law: Prepunishment and
the Causal Theory of Verdicts,” Nous 40, no. 1 (2006): pp. 166-183, hĴps://doi.org/10.1111/j.0029-
4624.2006.00605.x and Roy Sorensen, “Future Law: Prepunishment and the Causal Theory of Verdicts,”
Nous 40, no. 1 (2006): pp. 166-183, hĴps://doi.org/10.1111/j.0029-4624.2006.00605.x. My thanks to Dr.
Alasdair Richmond for discussing such issues with me, and for these preliminary recommendations for
further reading.
60. Begby, “Doxastic Morality”, 168.
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of bad luck.61 In this way, USA1950s seems to be an example of a HNIEC.
On this basis, we have strongmotivation for finding Fricker’s analysis of USA1950s
also applicable to RON, meaning that, by Fricker’s own lights, RON is epistemically
exculpated for the same reasons that Herbert in USA1950s is exculpated: Ron’s failure
to be testimonially virtuous with respect to the testimony of Indigenous Peoples is
subject to the same exculpatory inaccessibility of conceptual resources as Herbert’s.
Thus we have a case of a contemporaneous prejudiced belief that meets the standards
set by Fricker for epistemic exculpation. Were Ron to perpetrate a testimonial injustice
against one of the Indigenous Peoples in the local reservation, for example, if they try
to explain to him their history of being oppressed by white seĴlers, Ron, while at fault
for perpetrating the epistemically unjust IPCD, would, on Fricker’s own analysis, be
epistemically exculpated. In such a case, as counterintuitive as it may seem, we would
not be justified in having a “resentment of blame” towards Ron, but only a “resentment
of disappointment” towards the circumstances that produced RON.
5 Conclusion
In closing, this paper has provided an epistemic basis for Cramer’s imperative to view
the prejudiced perspective of Ron, the logger from Northern Wisconsin, not as “just
plain racism” but rather as the consequence of a much more complicated set of be-
liefs. In doing so, it has shown (i) that within the “politics of resentment”, Ron’s pre-
judiced perspective is more epistemically insidious than a common view of prejudice
suggests, (ii) that Ron’s location in a highly non-ideal epistemic context is sufficient
for the epistemic exculpation of his prejudiced perspective, and (iii) that, in addition
to historical-cultural distance, Ron’s contemporary-cultural distance from the present
moral discourse is sufficient for his epistemic exculpation. Taken together, these points
suggest a counterintuitive, perhaps troubling conclusion about cases like RON. Inso-
far as an individual with an epistemically insidious belief has always been subject to
a highly non-ideal epistemic context, any resentment of blame we harbour towards
them is unjustified – we can only justifiably harbour a resentment of disappointment
towards the circumstances that produced their prejudiced perspective.
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